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Professor Sutherland examines the establishment clause of the first
amendment from several perspectives - historical, pragmatic, and logical.
He concludes that from each viewpoint, that clause of the Constitution
does not forbid federal aid to education, regardless of church affiliations,
and predicts Supreme Court approval in the near future of such federal
assistance. The author asserts, and makes persuasive supporting argu-
ments, thdt the Constitution only forbids the establishment of a State
church, and in no way prohibits aid to education that may incidentally
benefit religious organizations. Professor Sutherland also suggests that
the Supreme Court may well decide aspects of this question in its current
session.
FACTORS IN CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION
# HAT AMERICANS have wanted in their Constitution, theyhave ultimately gotten. Sometimes popular outcry has been
strong enough to activate the amending process. So came the Bill
of Rights in 1791 in response to demands in five ratifying conven-
tions.' The 11th amendment
of 1798 responded to patriotic
THE AUTHOR: ARTnuR E. StnxRm- indignation at loyalists' suits in
LAND (A.B., Wesleyan University; federal courts, brought against
LL.B., Harvard University, J.S.D., Suf-
folk University) is Bussey Professor of States to recover for confisca-
Law at Harvard University Law School. tions during the Revolution.'
The post-Civil War amend-
ments were evidence of the
emotional urge that had earlier sounded across the North in the
"Battle Hymn of the Republic."3  A burst of nationwide disgust
brought repeal of the 18th amendment in 1933.
Sometimes when the general will becomes urgent the Supreme
Court is prompted to action and the amending process becomes un-
necessary. State legislatures and the Congress, responding to popu-
lar demands for economic reforms, had set the pace for the Court
in this manner when that tribunal changed its constitutional attitude
toward the New Deal in 1937. Our State and national lawmakers
had passed wage-and-hour laws, child labor laws, and economic
1 See J. LANDON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND GOvmmNENT OP THE
UNITED STATES 111-24 (2d rev. ed. 1905).
2 See id. at 302-04.
3 See id. at 257-64.
4 See C. BEARD, AmC.AN GOVERNmENT AND POLmIcs 446-47 (7th ed. 1936).
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regulation of many other varieties, in steadily increasing quantities
during the latter part of the 19th and the first third of the 20th cen-
tury. The Court's New Deal change of direction, forecast by Neb-
bia v. New York5 in 1934 and obvious from NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.' in 1937, simply aligned the Supreme Court
with the political insistence of the American people.
The effect of our 1937 "constitutional revolution"' was, after
all, not so startling. Some authors of academic literature, cherish-
ing hyperbole, the prime American rhetorical device, have over-
stated the effect of Supreme Court disapproval, before 1937, on
State and national economic regulation.8 The Court has upheld
over the years far more than it has struck down.9 Legislatures have
not been paralyzed by adjudications under the commerce clause and
the two due process clauses. They had not, for generations before
Franklin Roosevelt, felt any need for that President's 1935 admoni-
tion to resolve constitutional doubts in favor of enacting urgently
needed and evidently beneficial legislation. ° The annual statutes
of the several States, and the successive volumes of the United States
Statutes at Large, demonstrate the great and increasing amount of
economic regulation during the decades prior to 1937.
When the Supreme Court validated the New Deal, the Jus-
tices fell in line with the constitutional views of the legislatures.
Constitutional opinions of legislators deserve their due measure of
respect. One may sometimes regard too lightly the inclusive terms
of the third paragraph of article six of the Constitution of the United
States, under which all public officers, State and national, bind
themselves by oath to act constitutionally:
5 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
6 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
7 The phrase is borrowed from E.S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
LTD. (1941).
8 See, e.g., Feldman, Legal Aspects of Federal and State Price Control, 16 Bos-.
U.L. REV. 570 (1936).
9 See, e.g., Boston Store v. American Graphaphone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (1918).
10 The President gave this advice in a letter to Congressman Hill in reference to
pending legislation. He wrote:
Manifestly, no one is in a position to give assurance that the proposed act
will withstand constitutional tests, for the simple fact that you can get not
ten but a thousand differing legal opinions on the subject. But the situation
is so urgent and the benefits of the legislation so evident that all doubts should
be resolved in favor of the bill, leaving to the courts, in an orderly fashion,
the ultimate question of constitutionality.... I hope your committee will not
permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the sug-
gested legislation. 4 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FaANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 297 (S. Rosenman Comp. 1938).
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The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive andjudicial officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Con-
stitution.
Legislators who vote for legislation, and the President or Governor
who approves it, create a precedent of constitutionality, rebuttable
in court, but properly persuasive.
Validation of the New Deal was easier than it might have been,
due to the fact that the Court, by cautious wisdom and perhaps a
little luck, had left itself routes for retreat when retreat became de-
sirable. The "current of commerce" concept which Holmes had
used in 1905 to uphold the constitutionality of applying the Sher-
man Act to collusive sales in stock yards;" the federal power to con-
trol those local episodes which affect interstate matters which Jus-
tice Hughes had recognized in the 1914 Shreveport Rates Case;
12
the attitude toward "economic due process" which in 1898 had
brought the Court to uphold a Utah 8-hour day law in the mining
and smelting industries:1" these doctrines, selectively applied prior
to 1937, were ready and waiting for use as constitutional infrastruc-
tures of the New Deal when the Court saw that the situation had
become urgent and that the benefits of a mass of economic regula-
tion had become evident to the great preponderance of national and
State legislators and to the people who had elected them.
Today the country faces a situation somewhat similar to that of
1935 and 1936, but now the prospect of possible judicial negation
concerns not economic regulation but a growing mass of federal and
State legislation which gives aid for secular studies to students in
church-connected schools equally with pupils in public schools.
Whatever federal constitutional threat there is (and I can not think
the menace very serious) arises from the first amendment's "estab-
lishment of religion" clause, and the latent presence of anti-estab-
lishment principles in the 14th amendment's guarantee of due proc-
ess and equal protection. There are, to be sure, clauses in many
State constitutions14 which inhibit State support of sectarian institu-
tions, but no State prohibition can veto any part of the growing
mass of federal aids to education.15 The need for better schooling
11 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
12 Houston & Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
13 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).14 See, e.g., ARIz CoNs. art. 9, § 10; MINN. CoNsT. art. 8, § 3; N.Y. CONST.
art. 11, § 4.15 Federal welfare legislation normally functions through the cooperation of State
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at all levels in America has been increasingly urgent for many years;
there has long since become evident to the Congress and to many
State legislatures the inevitability of aid in secular education to stu-
dents in both public and church-connected institutions. An increas-
ing aggregate of national and State educational programs of this
character which in one way or another might raise a federal consti-
tutional issue, and some State judicial challenges to such State edu-
cational subventions which have already occurred, suggest that be-
fore long a confrontation may occur in the Supreme Court of the
United States. 6
This paper explores the situation, and predicts validation under
the Federal Constitution. The precedent of 1937 will repeat itself.
A declaration of constitutional validity of such nondiscriminatory
educational aids today should be much easier than the validation of
New Deal federal economic regulation in Jones & Laughlin and the
cases which followed. The existing legislative construction of the
Constitution in educational statutes is at least as persuasive as the
legislative precedent was in the economic regulation area before
1937; and, in the educational field, the Supreme Court has no line
of precedents to overrule. The Court need undertake no difficult
search for decisional escape routes. Governmental help for a pa-
rochial schoolchild to learn to read secular textbooks seems wholly
unlike the "establishment" of a "national religion" which, on June
8, 1789, Madison in the House of Representatives undertook to
forbid by constitutional amendment. A State statute furnishing the
same free chemistry texts to all schoolchildren, in public and pa-
rochial schools alike, hardly seems to deprive anyone of due process
or equal protection of the law.
THE CULTURAL-HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The American climate of opinion is far more favorable to the
constitutionality of educational aids to parochial pupils than it was
in the late 19th century. Decline in the suspicious and resentful
rivalry between different religious groups, both in Europe and the
United States, is a welcome development of our time. The extent
officials; however, where local law prohibits this cooperation, the federal subvention
may go directly - and presumptively constitutionally - to the beneficiaries via fed-
eral functionaries. See, e.g., National School Lunch Act of 1946, 42 U.S.C. § 1751
(1964), which for 20 years has provided school lunches for parochial and public school
pupils alike.
16The confrontation may have started. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
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of this happy change becomes abundantly evident from a backward
glance. The first permanent English colonies in America were
founded in the early 17th century amid religious bitterness which
arose from complicated causes now hard to understand. Undoubt-
edly, this rancor was connected with national adherence to one reli-
gion or another as a matter of official policy. In the 16th century
open revolutionary warfare had raged between religious sects in
various European nations; when one side felt weak, it would call
on nearby countries of its own religious affiliation for aid in the
internal struggle. The third volume of the Cambridge Modern
History,17 significantly entitled The Wars of Religion, fills its 900
pages with such sorry annals - accounts of campaigns between
Huguenots and Catholics in France; of English intervention on the
Huguenot side; of the war between Protestant England and Cath-
olic Spain, and its climactic sea battle between the Armada and the
English fleet. Puritans came to New England in the forepart of
the 17th century because the Established Church persecuted them
at home. Then, in 1660, the Puritans in turn hanged Mary Dyer
and her Quaker brethren on Boston Common because the Friends
stubbornly preached their religion, which seemed sedition to the
Puritan theocrats." One reason for the Glorious Revolution of
1688, which sent the Catholic James II into exile from Protestant
England, was the prospect that at his death he would leave a Cath-
olic heir to the English throne. The English Bill of Rights of 1689
denounced James on the ground that he "did endeavor to subvert
and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of
this kingdom," and praised "his Highnesse the Prince of Orange
(whome it hath pleased Almighty God to make the Glorious instru-
ment of delivering this kingdome from Popery and arbitrary
power).' 19
In 1700, British colonists in New York and New England
thought of Catholicism as French, and pictured Jesuit missionaries
on the northern frontiers as hostile agents. On August 9, 1700,
the New York Assembly passed "An Act Against Jesuits and Popish
Preists,"
who by their wicked and Subtle Insinuations Industriously Labour
to Debauch Seduce and w'thdraw the Indians from their due obe-
dience unto his most Sacred ma'ty and to Excite and Stir them up
17 3 CAMBRIDGE MODERN HIsTORY, THE WARS OF RELIGION (1905).
18 See T. WERTBNBAKER, THE PURITAN OLIGOPOLY 229-37 (1947).
19 This quote is taken from J. MAcy, THE ENGLISH CONSTIUTION 508, 510
(1897).
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to Sedition Rebellion and open Hostility against his ma'tys Gov-
erm't.
The Act ordered every Catholic clergyman to leave the province of
New York on or before November 1, 1700; and any such clergy-
man
who shall Continue abide remaine or come into this province or
any part thereof after ye first day of November aforesaid shall be
deemed and Accounted an incendiary and disturber of the publick
peace and Safety and an Enemy to the true Christian Religion and
shal be adjudged to Suffer perpetuall Imprisonm't and if any per-
son being so Sentenced and actually Imprisoned shall break prison
and make his Escape and be Afterwards retaken he shall Suffer
such paines of Death penalties and forfeitures as in Cases of ffel-
ony.20
But the 18th century saw a steady decline in the intensity of
religious rivalry in America. The new State constitutions adopted
after Independence contain little trace of the prerevolutionary estab-
lishments of religion, and even these traces had almost entirely dis-
appeared by the end of the 1830's. We had too much diversity
among Protestant sects to tolerate any favoritism. The two decades
before the Civil War saw a flareup of anti-Catholic, antiforeigner
sentiment, probably acerbated by large immigration of impoverished
Irish fleeing the potato famine in their native country. When these
newcomers established themselves in the larger American cities and
demonstrated considerable talent for coherent political organization,
they not surprisingly urged that whatever taxes they paid to support
schools should go to support those schools in which their devoutly
held Catholic religion was taught. This in turn aroused a xeno-
phobic reaction among certain groups proud to call themselves "na-
tive Americans," and gave rise to the short-lived "Know-Nothing"
political party of the 1850's. Anti-Catholic sentiment lasted long
enough for the House of Representatives to pass by a vote of 180
to 7 in 1876 the proposed Blaine amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, which would have forbidden the use of State funds for any
religious sect.2
The Blaine amendment died because it failed to get the required
20 1 COL. LAWs N.Y. 428-29 (1700). The Massachusetts General Court had en-
acted a similar measure on May 29, 1700. See 1 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE PRov-
INCE OF THE MASSACHUSErrs BAY 423 (1700).
2 1 The proposed amendment took its name from its sponsor, James G. Blaine, a
Congressman from Maine. See H. AMEs, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 277-78 (1897)
(published as vol. 2 of the 1896 Annual Report of the American Historical Association).
See also Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARv. L. REv. 939
(1951).
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2/3 vote in the Senate; however, alarmed Protestant majorities
wrote restrictions into most State constitutions prohibiting the
appropriation of public money to schools controlled by religious
organizations. 22 In 1894 a New York constitutional convention
adopted, and the State's electorate approved, what is sometimes
loosely called a "Blaine amendment."
Neither the state nor any subdivision thereof shall use its property
or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be
used, directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for
examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning
wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is
taught... 23
Perhaps the high point of this variety of legislation was the
Oregon statute of November 7, 1922, adopted by the voters of that
State under the initiative provisions of its constitution. The statute
required all children to attend public school from the age of 8 to
the age of 15, in effect preventing attendance at church-connected
institutions for most of the primary and part of the high school
years.2 4 The Supreme Court in 1925 held the statute unconstitu-
tional under the 14th amendment.25
In the last four decades the sentiments which induced these
enactments have been steadily declining in the United States. Such
changes in popular opinion concerning fundamentals of policy do
occur, but the time of the general change and its causes are hard to
identify. Probably many causes converge. W. E. H. Lecky, in the
introduction to his History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit
of Rationalism in Europe, describes
the fierce theological controversies that accompanied and followed
the Reformation, while a judicial spirit was as yet unknown, while
each party imagined itself the representative of absolute and neces-
sary truth in opposition to absolute and fatal error... Each the-
ologian imagined that the existence of the opinions he denounced
was fully accounted for by the exertions of certain evil-minded
men, who had triumphed by means of sophistical arguments, aided
by a judicial blindness that had been cast upon the deluded....
22Note, Catholic Schools and Public Money, 50 YALH L.J. 917 (1941), wherein is
compiled a list of such enactments. A number of States construe these provisions to
allow public benefits to parochial pupils. In 1961, however, the General Counsel to
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare reported that officials in more than
half the States were thus inhibited. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL AID TO Eiu-
CATION IN ITS VAluous ASPECTS, S. Doc. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1961).
2 3N.Y. CoNST. art. 11, § 4.
24 Compulsory Education Act, Ore. Laws § 5259 (1922).
25 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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But when towards the close of the eighteenth century the decline
of theological passions enabled men to discuss these matters in a
calmer spirit and when increased knowledge produced more com-
prehensive views, the historical standing-point was materially al-
tered. It was observed that every great change of belief had been
preceded by a great change in the intellectual condition of Europe,
that the success of any opinion depended much less upon the force
of its arguments, or upon the ability of its advocates, than upon
the predisposition of society to receive it, and that that predisposi-
tion resulted from the intellectual type of the age.26
A complication in estimating sources of "the intellectual type
of the age" in the middle of the 20th century is the fact that means
of rapid communication and swift movement of persons have made
development of ideas to a certain extent worldwide. To sort out
that which is parochial from that which occurs in many countries
entails difficult speculations. One factor in today's relaxation of
interreligious suspicion and rivalry within the United States may
well have been the slowing of immigration brought about by World
War I, and which, as a result of federal statutory provisions, 27 has
continued ever since. We have not for 50 years seen ships arriving
at our ports crowded with newcomers, many of them having deep
cultural differences from longer established Americans. The de-
scendants of the Irish immigrants of the 1840's, no longer concen-
trated in urban masses, have ceased to be strangers; the Italian
newcomers who followed them to New York and Boston have
evolved in a similar manner.
Since World War II the widespread ecumenical movement, evi-
dent in the Vatican Councils of Pope John and Pope Paul, has had
conspicuous effect in America. On September 15, 1967, the New
York Times carried an announcement by Bishop Fulton Sheen of
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, New York, that two
Protestant clergymen had joined the faculty of the diocesan St. Ber-
nard's Seminary.2  A Roman Catholic scholar-priest has become
Guest Professor of Roman Catholic Studies at the Harvard Divinity
School. A New York State constitutional convention, sitting in
the summer and autumn of 1967, by a large majority vote submitted
to that State's electors a new State constitution not containing the
"Blaine amendment" of 1894, substituting in its place the religion
26 W. LECKY, Introduction to HISTORY OF THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE
SPIRIT OF RATIONALISM IN EUROPE at v (1886).
27 See generally F.L. AUERBACH, IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
75-85 (2d ed. 1961), wherein text and tables regarding these laws are found.
2 8 N.y. Times, Sept. 15, 1967, § 1, at 1, cols. 7-8.
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clause of the federal first amendment. One might have hoped that
this action by the convention indicated a general relaxation of emo-
tional religious rivalries in New York. That State's highest court
had already upheld a statute providing for free loans of secular text-
books to parochial pupils,29 thus by the "pupil benefit theory" tak-
ing most of the practical effect out of the State's Blaine clause. But
the symbolism of the proposed deletion awakened dormant feelings,
and on November 7, 1967, a majority voted against the new con-
stitution. Undoubtedly the elimination of the Blaine clause was a
strong factor in its defeat. 0 Emotional religious rivalries have not
disappeared. Nevertheless Catholicism is no longer the symbol of
strangeness that it was in the mainly Protestant America of a few
generations ago. Battle cries are less shrill than they were. All
America mourned when our first Roman Catholic President died.
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
AND THE CONGRESS
From the earliest days of the first amendment, the Congress has
demonstrated its opinion that not every federal statute from which
some religion might gain support was for that reason invalid under
the establishment clause. The first amendment became effective on
December 5, 1791, when Virginia's ratification provided the requi-
site three-fourths of the then 14 States. Less than 2 months later,
in January and February 1792, the House of Representatives was
debating a measure to increase the Army. A number of the mem-
bers in 1792 had been Congressmen when the House debated the
first amendment in 1789 - including in that number James Madi-
son who proposed its first draft. On February 1, 1792, the House
by a vote of 29 to 19 passed the bill in question.3 Among many
other provisions the bill set the pay of an Army chaplain at $50
29 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, "228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1967), prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968) (No. 660).
Review cannot, of course, affect the State court's interpretation of the New York constitu-
tion.
30 The proposal had strong opposition. The New York Times was editorially
against it. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1967, § 1, at 46, cols. 1-2. Support for the amend-
ment was strongest in Manhattan and rural areas. Hacker, The Blaine Amendment -
Yes or No?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 27. For an analysis of the
symbolic effect of the omission, see Zion, Aid to Church Schools, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1967, § 2, at 56, cols. 3-4.
31 Of the 29 members of the Second Congress who voted for the bill in 1792, at
least 14 had been members of the First Congress which had proposed the first amend-
ment. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 95-121 (1789) [1789-1791]; 3 id. 355 (1792)
[1791-1793].
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per month. Madison voted for the measure. Ultimately the Senate
and House agreed on some amendments; in March 1792, President
Washington approved the bill with its provision for the chaplain,
and it thus became law. 2 Washington took his constitutional limi-
tations seriously; in February 1791 he had hesitated to sign the bill
creating the Bank of the United States, doubting that the Constitu-
tion gave the Congress power to charter a bank. He finally signed
the bank measure, evidently on Hamilton's urging."m The vote for
the Army bill by Madison and his majority colleagues in the House;
the vote of the Senate majority; the approval by a scrupulous Presi-
dent - all are convincing demonstrations that the Fathers did not
believe that by providing for an Army chaplain they were making
a "law respecting an establishment of religion" in defiance of the
first amendment."4 In the 18th century "an establishment of reli-
gion" was an institution well known to ordinary men. The Ameri-
can Bill of Rights, proposed by Congress in 1789, had many over-
tones of the English Bill of Rights adopted just a century earlier.
To a Congressman of 1789, the Glorious Revolution of 1688,
which got rid of Catholic James and established William and Mary
and their militant Protestantism, was an event as recent as Appo-
matox and the 13th amendment are to men of our day. In Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts in 1789 stood the spacious house built only
29 years earlier for the Reverend Mr. East Apthorp of Boston, a
clergyman of the Church of England. He had sailed for England
in 1764 amid somewhat ill-tempered rumors that he aspired to royal
appointment as an American bishop, and he never came back.35 In
1789, when drafting the first amendment, Americans remembered
32 Act of March 5, 1792, ch. 9, § 7, 1 Stat. 242.
3 3 See B. HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 117-18 (1957).
34 The Supreme Court of the United States has never decided the chaplaincy ques-
tion. In 1928 the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia dismissed a bill filed
against the Treasurer of the United States to enjoin the payment of military and con-
gressional chaplains. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed, Elliot
v. White, 23 F.2d 997 (D.C. Ct. App. 1928), citing to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923), holding that petitioner, whether as a citizen or a taxpayer, lacked standing.
In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 437 (1962), Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a concurring
opinion agreeing in the unconstitutionality of prayers in a New York public school.
He spoke of governmental financing of religious exercises as "an unconstitutional un-
dertaking whatever form it takes." He mentions chaplains without further comment.
Id. at 438-39 n.2. Apparently his sweeping dictum applies to them.
35 The historian of Apthorp House, Wendell Garrett, thought that East Apthorp's
departure inspired a cartoon in the London Political Register for September 1769. In
this picture a bishop is scrambling up the rigs of a departing ship, which a mob is push-
ing away from a quai. One of the spectators is shouting "No Lords Spiritual or Tem-
poral in New England." See W.D. GARRETTr, APTHoRP HoUSE 1760-1960 (1967).
The House is now the Master's Residence of Adams House, Harvard.
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that in England (with which a treaty of peace had ended the War
of Independence only 6 years before) bishops sat in the House of
Lords. In those days an establishment of religion meant a church
supported by the government, and, regardless of such tax support
as Massachusetts and Connecticut might give to the salary of con-
gregational ministers, the newly independent Americans were not
going to tolerate a national church, established and preferred by
Congress over all other varieties of religion, as Parliament had pre-
ferred the Church of England. But these remembered resentments
did not inhibit the Congress of 1792 from providing an infantry
major's pay for an Army chaplain.
The Congress has never in recent times been seriously inhibited
in educational matters by the first amendment's establishment
clause. In 1961, the General Counsel of the United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare produced a memorandum en-
tided Constitutionality of Federal Aid to Education in its Various
Aspects."8 On 12 pages of this document appears a compilation
entitled Federal Programs Under Which Institutions with Religious
Affiliation Receive Federal Funds Through Grants or Loans."
Some of these programs had lapsed by 1961, but most were then
still functioning. All were demonstrations that the Congress, and
the President also (unless there may have been instances of passage
over a veto), saw no constitutional objection to aiding students to
gain secular instruction at church-connected institutions. The Na-
tional Defense Education Act 8 includes nine such programs; the
Public Health Service administers ten; the Office of Vocational Re-
habilitation, two; Social Security Administration, two; and, the Sur-
plus Property Utilization Program, one. The Atomic Energy Com-
mission offers five programs in aid of scientific education; the
Veterans Administration, three; the National Science Foundation,
five; and the State Department offers several, of which the U.S.
information and educational exchange programs, and the programs
of technical cooperation with foreign countries are two examples.
The Department of Defense supports a number of programs at in-
stitutions of learning - the most familiar are the programs at many
colleges for the training of reserve officers in the Army, Navy and
Air Force. A program for business management research had gone
forward under the Small Business Administration; on the books are
36 S. Doc. No. 29, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
37 Id. at 37-48.
38 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-592 (1964).
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four programs under the Department of Agriculture; and, there is
one program for university research under the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration. The Housing and Home Finance
Agency ran a College Housing Loan Program under the Housing
Act of 1950.3"
Since 1961, the Congress has instituted additional important
new programs which aid students in church-connected as well as
public educational institutions. It has carried forward by subse-
quent appropriations most of the older activities listed in the 1961
memorandum. All these programs have common features, of
which the most conspicuous is secular motivation, though church-
connected colleges may participate in all. The Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) at Notre Dame is intended to produce
officers, not to produce Catholics. To be sure, the program makes
an education at Notre Dame a little easier for ROTC students.
Notre Dame thus derives collateral benefits; and as that University
is oriented to Catholicism, some of the federal funds appropriated
for the Notre Dame ROTC do, at a couple of removes, give some
indirect support to the Catholic Church. Perhaps the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946, as amended," which authorizes the Atomic En-
ergy Commission (AEC) to make grants to institutions for nuclear
laboratory equipment, research reactors, and physics teaching aids,
offers an example even more striking. If, for example, St. Swithins
College, an imaginary but highly Episcopal institution conducted
by the Diocese of Ames, develops a reputation in science, the AEC
may equip its laboratory. St. Swithins, as a result, becomes much
more attractive to talented young men. But the AEC is trying to
make physicists, not Episcopalians; and the Congress and President
Truman must be credited with, the belief that they were acting con-
stitutionally when they respectively passed and approved the bill.
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965"' has
seven subdivisions called "Titles." Title I is 17 years old; it made
and continues to make provision for federal assistance for local edu-
cational agencies in areas affected by federal activity. It provides
no aid for parochial pupils, and so does not raise any question of
public support for a church. Title V, entitled Grants to Strengthen
State Departments of Education, provides no funds to any but pub-
lic agencies. No provision of it can be construed to give any aid
39 12 U.S.C. § 1749 (1964).
4042 U.S.C. 5 2051-111 (1964).
41 79 Stat. 27, as amended (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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to a church-connected school. Title VI contains definitions and
administrative provisions which do not affect the church-state ques-
tion. The last section of that title is significant, however: "Nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize the making of
any payment under this Act, or under any Act amended by this Act,
for religious worship or instruction."42
Title II of the 1965 Education Act, the next title which is also
(and confusingly) numbered II, title III, and tide IV are those
which are important when we begin to consider "an establishment
of religion." The first tide ii is entitled Financial Assistance to
Local Educational Agencies for the Education of Children of Low-
Income Families.43 The Act defines a "local educational agency"
as a public board of education or other public agency legally con-
stituted to serve public elementary or secondary schools.44 Title II
directs the United States Commissioner of Education to pay such
State agencies grants "to expand and improve their educational pro-
grams by various means (including preschool programs) which con-
tribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of
educationally deprived children."45  This title further directs the
Commissioner to calculate the amount of a grant to a local agency
by determining the number of children in the agency's district, aged
5 to 17 inclusive, whose families have a "low income" (initially
defined as $2,000 annually). Sums which the family receives un-
der a State "aid to dependent children" plan are not counted in this
total. The total federal grant to a school district is to be calculated
as a percentage (initially 50 percent) of the average per pupil ex-
penditure of the State, multiplied by the number of children of the
prescribed age of low income families within the school district in
question. The Commissioner may increase the amount in such dis-
tricts by an additional "basic incentive grant."4
Thus far the first title H contains no church-state complication.
But the federal grant is not calculated on the total of exclusively
public school children of low income families in the district; the
amount is predicated on the total number of children of such fam-
ilies in the district, no matter what schools they attend, private or
parochial. And the Commissioner must determine, as a condition
of any grant
42 § 605, 79 Stat. 58,20 U.S.C. § 885 (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
43 79 Star. 27,20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-m (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
44 Tit. VI, § 601(f), 79 Star. 56, 20 U.S.C. § 881(f) (Supp. II, Vol. I 1967).
45 § 201, 79 Stat. 30, 20 U.S.C. § 241 (a) (Supp. II, Vol. 11967).
46 §§ 204-05, 79 Star. 30, 20 U.S.C. § 241(c)(a)(2) (Supp. II, Vol. I 1967).
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(1) that payments under this title will be used for programs and
projects (including the acquisition of equipment and where neces-
sary the construction of school facilities) (A) which are designed
to meet the special educational needs of educationally deprived
children in school attendance areas having high concentrations of
children from low-income families and (B) which are of sufficient
size, scope, and quality to give reasonable promise of substantial
progress toward meeting those needs, and nothing herein shall be
deemed to preclude two or more local educational agencies from
entering into agreements, at their option, for carrying out jointly
operated programs and projects under this title; (2) that, to the
extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived chil-
dren in the school district of the local educational agency who are
enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools, such agency
has made provision for including special educational services and
arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and tele-
vision, and mobile educational services and equipment) in which
such children can participate.47
There are other conditions of inspectoral and administrative char-
acter. But whatever question might arise under the first amend-
ment's establishment clause derives from the language quoted above
authorizing participation by children attending "private elementary
and secondary schools" in special educational services and arrange-
ments (such as dual enrollment, educational radio and television,
and mobile educational services and equipment). The language is
broad enough, intentionally so, to include pupils of parochial
schools. About 20 percent of New York's school children attend
such schools. Is participation by such children in federal aid which
the statute also grants to all the rest of the eligible school popula-
tion an "establishment of religion" which the first amendment pro-
hibits?
The second title II in the 1965 Act is headed School Library
Resources, Textbooks, and Other Instructional Materials. This title
directs the Commissioner to make grants to State agencies to carry
out State plans for acquiring books, periodicals, documents, audio-
visual materials, textbooks, and other printed and published instruc-
tional materials. These materials are to be provided not only for
teachers and pupils in the public schools but also for those in "private
elementary and secondary schools in the State which comply with
the compulsory attendance laws of the State or are otherwise recog-
nized by it through some procedure customarily used in the State."
Instructional materials are to be only those approved for public
schools of the State;4" title to them remains in the State;49 the Com-
47 § 205 (a), 79 Stat. 30, 20 U.S.C. § 241 (e) (a) (Supp. II, Vol. I 1967).
48 § 205 (b), 79 Stat. 38, 20 U.S.C. § 825(b) (Supp. II, Vol. 11967).
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
missioner is to assure the use of federal funds only to augment local
funds, not to supplant them.5"
Title III provides for Supplementary Educational Centers and
Services,"' from which students in church-connected as well as pub-
lic schools may benefit. The Commissioner is to make grants to
public educational agencies for guidance, remedial instruction, dual
enrollment, specialized instruction in sciences, foreign languages,
and other subjects not taught in local schools or which can be pro-
vided more effectively on a centralized basis, and is to make modern
equipment and specially qualified personnel, including artists and
musicians, temporarily available to public and other nonprofit
schools, organizations, and institutions.52
Title IV authorizes the Commissioner to make grants to public
and private nonprofit universities and colleges for training and re-
search in the field of education. "Research and related purposes"
is defined to indude "demonstrations in the field of education' and
"experimental schools, except that such term does not include re-
search, research training, surveys, or demonstrations in the field of
sectarian instruction or the dissemination of information derived
therefrom." 4  Under this provision a Catholic university could ob-
tain a federal grant to conduct an educational demonstration or an
experimental school - provided that the school or the demonstra-
tion were entirely secular.
Legislation which similarly benefits public and parochial pupils
is appearing in several States.55 New York in 1965 adopted a text-
book-loan law, benefitting alike children in public and private
(generally parochial) schools.56 Rhode Island in 1956 had adopted
a law in substance the same.5" National and many State legislators
49 § 205 (a), 79 Stat. 38,20 U.S.C. § 825 (a) (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
50 § 203(a)(5), 79 Stat. 38,20 U.S.C. § 825 (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
51 79 Stat. 39,20 U.S.C. §§ 841-48 (Supp. II, Vol. 11967).
52§ 303(b), 79 Star. 41,20 U.S.C. § 843 (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
53 79 Stat. 44,20 U.S.C. §§ 331-32 (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
54 § 4(e), 79 Stat. 47,20 U.S.C. § 332(b) (Supp. II, Vol. 1 1967).
55 Of course, schoolbus laws to permit such inclusive benefits are widely adopted.
In 1938 New York relaxed its constitutional restriction to permit such service. The
Connecticut Supreme Court has upheld that State's similar law. Snyder v. Town of
Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299 (1961)
(for want of a substantial federal question).
56N.Y. EDuC. LAW § 701(3) (M.Kinney Supp. 1967). The constitutionality of
the statute has been upheld under the Federal and State Constitutions. Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1967), prob. juris.
noted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968) (No. 660).
57ILL GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-23-2 (Supp. 1966). A Rhode Island superior
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are coming to feel that public aid in nonclerical education, even
when extended to a child in a church-connected institution, has no
resemblance to the "establishment of religion" which the draftsmen
of the first amendment intended to forbid. The American people
now face the question whether, within the bounds of their Consti-
tution, they can have what their national legislature, and some of
their State legislatures, want them to have.
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE COURT
Literature, judicial and other, concerning the first amendment's
establishment clause is almost endless. I would serve no good pur-
pose by here attempting da capo a new discussion of the decisional
material and the abundant commentary upon it. 8 The first amend-
ment pointed out in plain words that the founding fathers saw a
difference between establishment of religion and its free exercise.
The Supreme Court has scrupulously guarded religious freedom.
It has held invalid State legislation which, even in a trifling way,
could have interfered with some individual's "free exercise" of his
faith; 9 it has inhibited State interference with evangelization even
when the public proclamation of doctrines was distasteful to hear-
ers.6" Nowhere in the United States is there room for a Bedford
gaol to lock up latter-day John Bunyans.6" The Supreme Court
has been tender - rightly so - of the religious sensitivities of
children obliged to attend public schools under the threat of truancy
laws." The Supreme Court will forbid even the most trifling pray-
court, in Bowerman v. O'Conner (unreported 1967), held this statute unconstitutional
under the fourteenth amendment and the State constitution. An appeal is probable.
Oregon has also held such a statute unconstitutional. Dickman v. School Dist-, 232
Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1964).
58 See generally S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA (1902);
L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953); A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1964). My late colleague Mark DeWolfe Howe pub-
lished his charming WEIL LECTURES as THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1965).
See also Sutherland, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1306 (1949)(regarding incidental religious benefits); Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel,
76 HARV. L. REv. 25 (1962) (regarding liturgical public school activity). Deci-
sional material is collected in P. FREUND, A. SUTHERLAND, M. HOWE & E. BROWN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2069-154 (3d ed. 1967). Historical surveys may be found in
A. SUTHERLAND, THE CHURCH SHALL BE FREE (1965), and A. SUTHERLAND, CON-
STITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA ch. 11 (1965).
59 See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
6 0 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
61 See id.; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948).
62 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In mak-
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erful exercise in the schools we all support by our tax contributions,
even though on request the pupils can be excused from attendance."3
No child in our widespread polity will suffer any governmental
harassment, no matter how trifling, because of his religious com-
mitment. I doubt that anyone ever will. The intellectual type of
the age is dead set against it.
Neither the Federal Education Act of 1965," nor the New York
and Rhode Island textbook laws, nor the manifold State laws which
provide schoolbus service for parochial as well as public school pu-
pils, put any constraint on -the individual. The free arithmetic text
for the pupil at St. Patrick's parochial school imposes no hardship
on the pupil at Public School No. 6 who gets the same book equally
free. The schoolbus which stops at St. Patrick's and at Public
School No. 6 on its morning round imposes no religious exercise
on anyone. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette65
and Everson v. Board of Education66 are poles apart. In Barnette
the public authorities punished the schoolchild whose religion for-
bade him to join in the classroom salute of the national flag; they
threatened his parents with prosecution as well. Everson's only
grievance was an addition to his taxes, ascribable to the expense of
transporting parochial pupils. The Supreme Court struck down
West Virginia's flag-salute law, but sustained the New Jersey bus
law litigated in Everson.
A curious feature of commentary on judicial opinions is its tend-
ency to prefer dicta over statements directly relevant to the ques-
tion decided. The fame of Justice Black's Everson opinion rests
largely on his eloquent, much-quoted explanation of what he was
not deciding, his statement about the establishment clause, begin-
ning "In]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church," and ending "[iln the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of
ing this statement I am not forgetting that States permit compliance with laws prescrib-
ing compulsory schooling by attendance at sectarian schools, which fact might offer a
child or his parents a means of withdrawal from unwelcome public school exercises.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has forbidden a State to legislate parochial schools out of
existence. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 707 (1925).
63 Cases cited note 59 supra, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
64 79 Stat 27, as amended (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
65319 U.S. 624 (1943).
60 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The authority of Everson was reenforced by Snyder v. Town
of Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299
(1961) (for want of a substantial federal question). See also Rhoades v. Abington
Township School Dist, 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d 53, appeal dismissed, 36 U.S.L.W. 3141
(U.S. Oct. 10, 1967).
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separation between church and state.' ,07 Much less frequently
quoted is Black's statement, in the succeeding two pages of his opin-
ion, about the secular public purpose of schoolbus transportation -
which after all was the question at issue in the case. He wrote.
It is undoubtedly true that children are helped to get to church
schools. There is even a possibility that some of the children
might not be sent to the church schools if the parents were com-
pelled to pay their children's bus fares out of their own pockets
when transportation to a public school would have been paid for
by the State. The same possibility exists where the state requires
a local transit company to provide reduced fares to school children
including those attending parochcial schools,68 or where a munici-
pally owned transportation system undertakes to carry all school
children free of charge. Moreover, state-paid policemen, detailed
to protect children going to and from church schools from the very
real hazards of traffic, would serve much the same purpose and ac-
complish much the same result as state provisions intended to guar-
antee free transportation of a kind which the state deems to be
best for the school children's welfare. And parents might refuse
to expose their children to the serious danger of traffic accidents
while going to and from parochial schools, the approaches to which
were not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents might be re-
luctant to permit their children to attend schools which the state
had cut off from such general government services as ordinary
police and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public
highways and sidewalks. Of course, cutting off church schools
from these services, so separate and so indisputably marked off
from the religious function, would make it far more difficult for
the schools to operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of
the First Amendment. That Amendment requires the state to be
a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.
State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than
it is to favor them.
This Court has said that parents may, in the discharge of their
duty under state compulsory education laws, send their children
to a religious rather than a public school if the school meets the
secular educational requirements which the state has power to im-
pose. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). It
appears that these parochial schools meet New Jersey's require-
ments. The State contributes no money to the schools. It does
not support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than
provide a general program to help parents get their children, re-
gardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from ac-
credited schools.69
67 330 U.S. at 15-16.
68 "New Jersey long ago permitted public utilities to charge school children re-
duced rates. See Public S.R. Co. v. Public Utility Comim'rs, 81 N.J.L. 363, 80 A. 27
(1911); see also Interstate Ry. v. Massachusetts [207 U.S. 79 (1908)]." Id. at 17 n.24.
6O Id. at 17-18.
ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION
Black's 1947 Everson opinion is a vigorous statement of the
"child benefit theory" - the doctrine that where legislation pri-
marily provides some secular benefit for the child, an incidental
benefit to religious education does not make the law unconstitu-
tional. Particularly relevant to this doctrine is another passage in
Everson where Justice Black cites and relies on the Supreme Court's
1930 decision in Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education.7
In Cochran the unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Hughes, upheld a Louisiana statute furnishing free textbooks to all
pupils, in parochial and public schools alike. Cochran, a taxpayer,
had sought an injunction against spending public funds for this pur-
pose, basing his complaint on various clauses in the Louisiana State
constitution, on the 14th amendment, and on article 4, section 4 of
the United States Constitution, the "republican form of govern-
ment" clause. Despite this battery of constitutional objections,
Louisiana courts and the United States Supreme Court upheld the
Louisiana textbook law. The Supreme Court had to meet Cochran's
contention that parochial education served only a "private" purpose
and that taxation for a private end deprived the taxpayer of property
without due process of law. Hughes writing for the unanimous
Supreme Court upheld the "public" purpose of education when
given either in a public or a parochial school. And Black in 1947
wrote in the majority opinion of the Court in the New Jersey
schoolbus case that "lilt is much too late to argue that legislation
intended to facilitate the opportunity of children to get a secular
education serves no public purpose. Cochran v. Louisiana State
Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 ....
Recently some comment has attempted to disparage the author-
ity of Cochran, on the theory that in 1930, when that decision was
rendered, the 14th amendment had not yet "incorporated" the en-
tire first amendment. This denigration of Cochran rests on the
theory that the "incorporation" of the literal terms of the first
amendment into the 14th amendment did not occur until 1940, when
the Court decided Cantwell v. Connecticut72 in which Justice Rob-
erts wrote: "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that
[14th] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First
Amendment .... ." He concluded that "the states fare] as incom-
petent as Congress to enact ... laws... respecting an establishment
70281 U.S. 370 (1930).
71330 U.S. at 7.
72 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof";73 that in 1930
the Supreme Court did not know what it was doing; that in 1940
its successors on that bench set it right; that after 1940 a statute
helping a student, aged 12, 16, or 20, to engage in secular studies,
such as arithmetic or physics, in a church-connected educational in-
stitution, would be void as unconstitutional under the first amend-
ment's establishment clause.
I think that those who express this view err. I think that they
depart from what Lecky called "the intellectual type of the age";
that in 1968 the social and governmental structure of the United
States serves our people by an intricate and astonishingly effective
complex of human organizations, some of which we habitually call
"public," some "private"; that the underlying constitutional ques-
tion is the preservation of all of us from any sort of tyranny, secu-
lar or religious, however difficult of definition the term "tyranny'"
may be; that the services to children in parochial schools promised
by the Federal Education Act of 1965 presage no tyranny, no in-
justice, and no unconstitutional "establishment of religion."
When Black cited Cochran to demonstrate the "public" charac-
ter of the secular subjects of education taught in parochial schools,
he was stating a profound insight into the operation of our constitu-
tional system. A man's religious beliefs and his devotional exer-
cises or abstention therefrom, are deeply "private" matters into
which government, national or State, is constitutionally forbidden
to intrude, no matter how slightly. When the Supreme Court for-
bade religious exercises in public schools,74 it demonstrated the
strictness of its adherence to this principle. But where government
places no religious constraint on anyone, where the student is en-
tirely free to go to a parochial or a public school, then I find diffi-
culty in understanding how anyone is deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, or is denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws, by a parochial student receiving free textbooks or
other secular aid granted by the State. When the public purpose
of educating the child in secular subjects is advanced by furnishing
him the benefits of the Federal Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965 or analogous legislation, I see no violation of the
73 Id. at 303. Five years before Cochran Justice Sanford wrote "freedom of speech
and of the press ... are among the fundamental personal rights. . . protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...." Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925).
74 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
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first amendment; I see no resemblance, in such a law, to the "estab-
lishment of religion" which obtained in England in 1789, and
which the men who drafted the first amendment in that year must
have had in their minds.
This construction of the first and 14th amendments accords
with the great mass of federal legislation giving aids to secular edu-
cational programs in church-connected as well as public educational
institutions, and with such State court decisions as that upholding
the New York free textbook statute.7 5 If the Federal Elementary
and Secondary Act of 1965 comes before the Supreme Court, the
"pupil benefit" construction of the first amendment would tend to
uphold the statute.7"
No Supreme Court decision conflicts with that first amendment
doctrine. Whatever Supreme Court precedent exists favors that
construction of the 14th amendment. One aspect of Horace Mann
League v. Board of Public Works77 has escaped much notice. Four
colleges were defendants in that litigation; as to one of these, Hood
College, the Maryland Court of Appeals found constitutional under
the 14th amendment a State grant of $500,000 to help erect a dor-
mitory and classroom -building.7" Hood College, the majority opin-
ion tells, "is church related through its affiliation with the United
Church of Christ [U.C.C.] but welcomes students of all religious
faiths." It is listed in a tabulation of the Danforth Foundation of
Institutions Associated with Religious Bodies as "reflecting religious
orientation. '"" The court of appeals wrote that the "College's stated
purposes in relation to religion are not of a fervent, intense or pas-
sionate nature .... Students are not required to attend and par-
ticipate in many religious observances."' o The United Church of
Christ contributes financially to the college, but not a great deal.
Hood College is, that is to say, somewhat church connected, some-
what religious in character, but not very much so.
75 Board of Educ. v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791, 281 N.Y.S.2d 799,
prob. juris. ooted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3286 (U.S. Jan. 16, 1968) (No. 660).
76 The Supreme Court may soon face this issue. For a discussion, see text accom-
panying note 92 infra.
77 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 97 (1966). I was
one of the counsel for the colleges in the case, and so am open to suspicion of bias. But
my bias in favor of the "pupil benefit" theory has a long history. As a member of the
1938 New York constitutional convention, I voted to permit schoolbuses to carry pa-
rochial students, a measure later approved by the voters.
78 Id. at 676, 220 A.2d at 68.
79 Id. at 672-73, 220 A.2d at 66.
s0ld. at 675, 220 A.2d at 67.
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The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States which dismissed the appeal in a brief memorandum.8 Dis-
missal of an appeal, where as here there is no procedural defect, is
an adjudication on the merits, an authoritative precedent.82 The
Court's memorandum did not state that the ground of dismissal was
for want of a substantial federal question, but no other ground for
dismissal appears, and two Justices (Harlan and Stewart) stated that
they would have noted probable jurisdiction.83 The Hood College
part of the Horace Mann case is Supreme Court precedent at least
for the proposition that direct State financial support of a church-
connected college is constitutional under the 14th amendment if
the contribution is for secular purposes and the church connection
is slight in degree.
Supreme Court precedent is scanty on federal grants to students
in church-connected institutions, or federal grants to the institutions
themselves for secular ends. Bradfield v. Roberts" in 1899 upheld
a congressional grant to an incorporated hospital. Writing for the
Court, Mr. Justice Peckham held that the Roman Catholic ecclesi-
astical character of the persons in charge did not alter the secular
quality of the corporation. The unsuccessful plaintiff was a citizen
and taxpayer of the United States; the Court slid easily over the
question of his standing to sue. In 1908 the Court upheld a con-
tract made by the United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs
with the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions, which agreed to main-
tain a number of Sioux Indian pupils in a Catholic school on an
Indian reservation. The Court found that the payment of these
funds was unobjectionable, on the ground that the funds were held
by the United States as trust funds allotted to the Sioux tribe in ex-
change for lands.85 The standing of plaintiffs, Sioux Indians, was
not made clear. Whatever the value of these cases, they contain no
suggestion of invalidity of the Education Act of 1965.
The scantiness of authority on federal legislation may derive
from the fact that educational grants oppress no one and deprive no
one of religious freedom - unless a federal taxpayer could be con-
sidered as wronged when some fraction of his contribution to the
federal treasury is paid out for a purpose which may in some way
81 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
82 Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959) (dictum).
83 385 U.S. at 97.
84 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
85 Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1910).
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lend help to a religion. Frothingham v. Mellon8 6 denied to a fed-
eral taxpayer standing to sue to enjoin a payment of federal money
for an allegedly unconstitutional purpose. But perhaps Congress
may legislatively overrule Frothingham (assuming that such an
overruling statute is within the constitutional powers of the Con-
gress). A recent Senate bill8" proposed to grant any federal income
taxpayer a right to sue to enjoin a federal officer from paying out
any sums under a group of specified acts, including the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which the plaintiff might
challenge on first amendment grounds.8 An amendment to this
bill proposed to permit any citizen, even if he paid no federal taxes,
to bring such an action. The legislation provided for jurisdiction
in the District Court of the District of Columbia. This bill was, of
course, an effort to avoid the holding in Frothingham. The meas-
ure passed in the Senate on July 29, 1966, but the House took no
action before Congress adjourned. On January 11, 1967, Senator
Ervin of North Carolina introduced an identical measure.89 Repre-
sentative Rosenthal of New York introduced in the House a com-
parable bill. 0 On December 1, 1967, the Senate bill passed unani-
mously; but, as before, the Conference Committee removed it. The
House Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on the bill early in
the second session of the 90th Congress. 1
But Supreme Court adjudication of the constitutionality of the
Federal Education Act of 1965, and of the numerous other federal
statutes of similar import, may not have to await a statutory over-
ruling of Frothingham. On October 16, 1967, the Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction of an appeal from a three-judge federal
court in the Southern District of New York which could conceivably
open the whole question.92 In that action Florence Flast and others
sued Secretary John W. Gardner, of the United States Department
86262 U.S. 447 (1923).
87 S. 2097, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
8 8 For a discussion of standing in cases involving federal grants, see 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1353 (1964).
89 S.3, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
90 H.R. 1198, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). REPORT OF THE STANDING
SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
S. REP. NO. 473, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-15 (1967) discusses the measure.
91 STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE
COMm. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., MONTHLY STAFF REPORT (Jan.
9, 1968).
02 F last v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 36 U.S.L.W.
3157 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1967). For a discussion of the case see N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1967,
at 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
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of Health, Education and Welfare, and Harold Howe, United States
Commissioner of Education, to enjoin use of federal funds under
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 to finance
guidance services and instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other
subjects, in religiously operated schools, and to prevent the expendi-
ture of federal funds for the purchase of textbooks and other in-
structional materials for use in such schools. Two members of the
three-judge court voted to dismiss the complaint for lack of juris-
diction of the subject matter on the authority of Frothingham. Dis-
trict Judge Frankel dissented. The plaintiffs then filed the appeal
of which probable jurisdiction has been noted. An overruling of
Frothingham, and if it is overruled, a Supreme Court adjudication
of unconstitutionality, remain speculative as these words are written.
Prediction of the outcome of constitutional adjudication in pend-
ing litigation is rash, and perhaps in questionable taste. The mass
of federal aids which go alike to students in lay and church-con-
nected educational institutions ranging from school lunches to the
ROTC, going back over many years, certainly creates extensive leg-
islative precedent. For it all to be struck down as "an unconstitu-
tional establishment of religion" is a prospect which gives the ob-
server pause.
